Abstract. We study stochastic two-player turn-based games in which the objective of one player is to ensure several infinite-horizon total reward objectives, while the other player attempts to spoil at least one of the objectives. The games have previously been shown not to be determined, and an approximation algorithm for computing a Pareto curve has been given. The major drawback of the existing algorithm is that it needs to compute Pareto curves for finite horizon objectives (for increasing length of the horizon), and the size of these Pareto curves can grow unboundedly, even when the infinite-horizon Pareto curve is small. By adapting existing results, we first give an algorithm that computes the Pareto curve for determined games. Then, as the main result of the paper, we show that for the natural class of stopping games and when there are two reward objectives, the problem of deciding whether a player can ensure satisfaction of the objectives with given thresholds is decidable. The result relies on intricate and novel proof which shows that the Pareto curves contain only finitely many points. As a consequence, we get that the two-objective discounted-reward problem for unrestricted class of stochastic games is decidable.
Introduction
Formal verification is an area of computer science which deals with establishing properties of systems by mathematical means. Many of the systems that need to be modelled and verified contain controllable decisions, which can be influenced by a user, and behaviour which is out of the user's control. The latter can be further split into events whose presence can be quantified, such as failure rate of components, and events which are considered to be completely adversarial, such as acts of an attacker who wants to break into the system. Stochastic turn-based games are used as a modelling formalism for such systems [4] . Formally, a stochastic game comprises three kinds of states, owned by one of three players: Player 1, Player 2, and the stochastic player. In each state, one or more transitions to successor states are available. At the beginning of a play, a token is placed on a distinguished initial state, and the player who controls it picks a transition and the token is moved to the corresponding successor state. This is repeated ad infinitum and a path, comprising an infinite sequence of states, is obtained. Player 1 and Player 2 have a free choice of transitions, and the recipe for picking them is called a strategy. The stochastic player is bound to pick each transition with a fixed probability that is associated with it.
The properties of systems are commonly expressed using rewards, where numbers corresponding to gains or losses are assigned to states of the system. The numbers along the infinite paths are then summed, giving the total reward of an infinite path, intuitively expressing the energy consumed or the profit made along a system's execution. Alternatively, the numbers can be summed with a discounting δ < 1, giving discounted reward. It formalises the fact that immediate gains matter more than future gains, and it is particularly important in economics where money received early can be invested and yield interest.
Traditionally, the aim of one player is to make sure the expected (discounted) total reward exceeds a given bound, while the other player tries to ensure the opposite. We study the multi-objective problem in which each state is given a tuple of numbers, for example corresponding to both the profit made on visiting the state, and the energy spent. Subsequently, we give a bound on both profit and energy, and Player 1 attempts to ensure that the expected total profit and expected total energy exceed (or do not exceed) the given bound, while Player 2 tries to spoil this by making sure that at least one of the goals is not met.
The problem has been studied in [7] , where it has been shown that Pareto optimal strategies might not exist, and the game might not be determined (for some bounds neither of the players have ε-optimal strategies). A value iteration algorithm has been given for approximating the Pareto curve of the game, i.e. the bounds Player 1 can ensure. The algorithm successively computes, for increasing n, the sets of bounds Player 1 can ensure if the length of the game is restricted to n steps. The approach has two major drawbacks. Firstly, the algorithm cannot decide, for given bounds, if Player 1 can achieve them. Secondly, it does not scale well since the representation of the sets can grow with increasing n, even if the ultimate Pareto curve is small.
The above limitations show that it is necessary to design alternative solution approaches. One of the promising directions is to characterise the shape of the set of achievable bounds, for computing it efficiently. The value iteration of [7] allows us to show that the sets are convex, but no further observations can be made, in particular it is not clear whether the sets are convex polyhedra, or if they can have infinitely many extremal points. The main result of our paper shows that for two-objective case and stopping games, the sets are indeed convex polyhedra, which directly leads to a decision algorithm. We believe that our proof technique is of interest on its own. It proceeds by assuming that there is an accumulation point on the Pareto curve, and then establishes that there must be an accumulation point in one of the successor states such that the slope of the Pareto curves in the accumulation points are equal. This allows us to obtain a cycle in the graph of the game in which we can "follow" the accumulation points and eventually revisit some of them infinitely many times. By further analysing slopes of points on the Pareto curves that are close to the accumulation point, we show that there are two points on the curve that are sufficiently far from each other yet have the same slope, which contradicts the assumption that they are near an accumulation point.
Our results also yield novel important contributions for non-stochastic games. Although there have recently been several works on non-stochastic games with multiple objectives, they a priori restrict to deterministic strategies, by which the associated problems become fundamentally different. It is easy to show that enabling randomisation of strategies extends the bounds Player 1 can achieve, and indeed, even in other areas of game-theory randomised strategies have been studied for decades: the fundamental theorem of game theory is that every finite game admits a randomised Nash equilibrium [13] .
Related work. In the area of stochastic games, single-objective problems are well studied. For reachability objectives the games are determined and the problem of existence of an optimal strategy achieving a given value is in NP∩co-NP [8] ; same holds for total reward objectives. In the multi-objective setting, [7] gives a value iteration algorithm for the multi-objective total reward problem. Although value iteration converges to the correct result, it does so only in infinite number of steps. It is further shown in [7] that when Player 1 is restricted to only use deterministic strategies, the problem becomes undecidable; the proof relies fundamentally on the strategies being deterministic and it is not clear how it can be extended to randomised strategies. The work of [1] extends the equations of [7] to expected energy objectives, and mainly concerns itself with a variant of multi-objective mean-payoff reward, where the objective is a "satisfaction objective" requiring that there is a set of runs of a given probability on which all mean payoff rewards exceed a given bound (i.e., expected values are not considered). [1] only studies existence of finite-memory strategies and the probability bound 1; this restriction has very recently been lifted by [3] , which shows that even unrestricted satisfaction objective problem is coNP-complete.
In non-stochastic games, multi-objective optimisation has been studied for multiple mean-payoff objectives and energy games [16] . A comprehensive analysis of the complexity of synthesis of optimal strategies has been given [5] , and it has been shown that a variant of the problem is undecidable [15] . The work of [2] studies the complexity of problems related to exact computation of Pareto curves for multiple mean-payoff objectives. In [11] , interval objectives are studied for total, mean-payoff and discounted reward payoff functions. The problems for interval objectives are a special kind of multi-objective problems that require the payoff to be within a given interval, as opposed to the standard single-objective setting where the goal is to exceed a given bound. As mentioned earlier, all the above works for non-stochastic games a priori restrict the players to use deterministic strategies, and hence the problems exhibit completely different properties than the problem we study.
Our contribution. We give the following novel decidability results. Firstly, we show that the problem for determined stochastic games is decidable. Then, as the main result of the paper, we show that for non-determined games which also satisfy the stopping assumption and for two objectives, the set of achievable bounds forms a convex polyhedron. This immediately leads to an algorithm for computing Pareto curves, and we obtain the following novel results as corollaries.
-Two-objective discounted-reward problem for stochastic games is decidable.
-Two-objective total-reward problem for stochastic stopping games is decidable.
Although we phrase our results in terms of stochastic games, to our best knowledge, the above results also yield novel decidability results for multi-objective non-stochastic games when randomisation of strategies is allowed.
Outline of the paper. In Sec. 3, we show a simple algorithm that works for determined games and show how to decide whether a stopping game is determined. In Sec. 4, we give decidability results for two-objective stopping games.
Preliminaries on stochastic games
We begin this section by introducing the notation used throughout the paper. Given a vector v ∈ R n , we use v i to refer to its i-th component, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The comparison operator ≤ on vectors is defined to be the componentwise ordering: u ≤ v ⇔ ∀i ∈ [1, n]. u i ≤ v i . We write u < v when u ≤ v and u = v. Given two vectors u, v ∈ R n , the dot product of u and v is defined by
The sum of two sets of vectors U, V ⊆ R n is defined by
u ≤ v}, and we use conv(V ) for the convex closure of V , i.e. the set of all v for which there are
is a vector x ∈ X that is not a convex combination of other points in X, i.e. x ∈ conv(X \ {x}). A function f : R → R is concave whenever for all x, y ∈ R and t ∈ [0, 1] we have
. Note that if f is concave then both limits are well-defined, because by concavity
is monotonic in x ′ ; nevertheless, the left and right slope might still not be equal.
A point p ∈ R 2 is an accumulation point of f if f (p 1 ) = p 2 and for all ε > 0, there exists x = p 1 such that (x, f (x)) is an extremal point of f and |p 1 − x| < ε. Moreover, p is a left (right) accumulation point if in the above we in addition have x < p 1 (resp. x > p 1 ). We sometimes slightly abuse notation by saying that x is an extremal point when (x, f (x)) is an extremal point, and similarly for accumulation points.
A discrete probability distribution (or just distribution) over a (countable) set S is a function µ : S → [0, 1] such that s∈S µ(s) = 1. We write D(S) for the set of all distributions over S, and use supp(µ) = {s ∈ S | µ(s) > 0} for the support set of µ ∈ D(S).
We now define turn-based stochastic two-player games together with the concepts of strategies and paths of the game. We then present the objectives that are studied in this paper and the associated decision problems.
Stochastic games.
A stochastic (two-player) game is a tuple G = S, (S , S ♦ , S ), ∆ where S is a finite set of states partitioned into sets S , S ♦ , and S ; ∆ : S ×S → [0, 1] is a probabilistic transition function such that ∆(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} if s ∈ S ∪S ♦ and t∈S ∆(s, t) = 1 if s ∈ S .
S and S ♦ represent the sets of states controlled by Player 1 and Player 2, respectively, while S is the set of stochastic states. For a state s ∈ S, the set of successor states is denoted by ∆(s) def = {t ∈ S | ∆(s, t)>0}. We assume that ∆(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S. A state from which no other states except for itself are reachable is called terminal, and the set of terminal states is denoted by Term def = {s ∈ S | ∆(s)={s}}.
Paths. An infinite path λ of a stochastic game G is a sequence (s i ) i∈N of states such that s i+1 ∈ ∆(s i ) for all i ≥ 0. A finite path is a prefix of such a sequence. For a finite or infinite path λ we write len(λ) for the number of states in the path. For i < len(λ) we write λ i to refer to the i-th state s i−1 of λ = s 0 s 1 . . . and λ ≤i for the prefix of λ of length i + 1. For a finite path λ we write last(λ) for the last state of the path. For a game G we write Ω + G for the set of all finite paths, and Ω G for the set of all infinite paths, and Ω G,s for the set of infinite paths starting in state s. We denote the set of paths that reach a state in
Strategies. We write Ω G and Ω ♦ G for the finite paths that end with a state of S and S ♦ , respectively. A strategy of Player 1 is a function π :
, and deterministic if π(λ) is Dirac for all λ ∈ Ω + G , i.e. π(λ)(s) = 1 for some s ∈ S. A strategy σ for Player 2 is defined similarly replacing Ω G with Ω ♦ G . We denote by Π and Σ the sets of all strategies for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Probability measures. A stochastic game G, together with a strategy pair (π, σ) ∈ Π × Σ and an initial state s, induces an infinite Markov chain on the game (see e.g. [6] ). We denote the probability measure of this Markov chain by P π,σ G,s . The expected value of a measurable function g :
G,s . We say that a game G is a stopping game if, for every strategy pair (π, σ), a terminal state is reached with probability 1, i.e. P π,σ G,s (♦Term) = 1 for all s. Total reward. A reward function ̺ : S → Q assigns a reward to each state of the game. We assume the rewards are 0 in all terminal states. The total reward of a path λ is ̺(λ) def = j≥0 ̺(λ j ). Given a game G, an initial state s, a vector of n rewards ̺ and a vector of n bounds z ∈ R n , we say that a pair of strategies (π, σ) yields an objective totrew(̺, z) if E A (lower) Pareto curve in s is the set of all maximal z such that for all ε > 0 there is π ∈ Π that achieves the objective totrew(̺, z − ε). We use f s for the Pareto curve, and for the two-objective case we treat it as a function, writing f s (x) = y when (x, y) ∈ f s . We say that a game is determined if for all states, every bound can be spoiled or lies in the downward closure of the Pareto curve 1 . Note that the downward closure of the Pareto curve equals the closure of A s .
Discounted reward. Discounted games play an important role in game theory. In these games, the rewards have a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) meaning that the reward received after j steps is multiplied by δ j , and so a discounted reward of a path λ is then ̺(λ, δ) = j≥0 ̺(λ j )·δ j . We define the notions of achieving, spoiling and Pareto curves for discounted reward disrew(̺, δ, z) in the same way as for total reward. Since the problems for discounted reward can easily be encoded using the total reward framework (by adding before each state a stochastic state from which with probability (1 − δ) we transition to a terminal state), from now on we will concentrate on total reward, unless specified otherwise.
The problems. In this paper we study the following decision problems. 
In the particular case when n above is 2, we speak about two-objective problems.
Simplifying assumption. In order to keep the proofs simple, we will assume that each non-terminal state has exactly two successors and that only the states controlled by Player 2 have weights different from 0. Note that any stochastic game can be transformed into an equivalent game with this property in polynomial time, so we do not lose generality by this assumption.
Example 3 (Floor heating problem).
As an example illustrating the definitions, as well as possible applications of our results, we consider a simplified version of the smart-house case study presented in [12] with a difference that we model both user comfort and energy consumption. Player 1, representing a controller, decides which rooms are heated, while the Player 2 represents the configuration of the house, for instance which door and windows are open, which cannot be influenced by the controller. The temperature in another room changes based on additional probabilistic factors. We illustrate this example in Fig. 1 and a simple model as a stochastic game is given in Fig. 2 (left) . We have to control the floor heating of two rooms in a house, by opening at most one of the valves V 1 and V 2 at a time.
The state of each room is either cold or hot, for instance in state H, C, the first room is warm while the second one is cold, and the third room has unknown temperature. Weights on the first dimension represent the energy con- sumption of the system while the second represent the comfort inside the house. Player 2 controls whether the door D between the second room and a third one is open or not. The temperature T in the other room of the house is controlled by stochastic transitions. For instance in the initial state (C, C), the controller can choose either to switch on the heating in room 1 or room 2. Then the second player chooses whether the door is opened or not and stochastic states determine the contribution of the other rooms: for instance from (H, C) if the second player chooses that the door is opened then depending on whether the temperature of the other room is low or high, room 2 can either stay cold or get heated through the door, and the next state in that case is (H, H) which is the terminal state. The objective is to optimise energy consumption and comfort until both rooms are warm. The Pareto curve for a few states of the game is depicted in Fig. 2 (right).
Equations for lower value
We recall the results of [7, 1] showing that for stopping games the sets of achievable points A s are the unique solution to the sets of equations defined as follows:
The equations can be used to design a value-iteration algorithm that iteratively computes sets X i s for increasing i: As a base step we have X 0 s = dwc(0) (where 0 = (0, . . . , 0)); we then substitute X i s for X s on the right-hand side of the equations, and obtain X i+1 s as X s on the left-hand side. The sets X i s so obtained converge to the least fixpoint of the equations above [7, 1] . As we will show later, the sets X i s might be getting increasingly complex even though the actual solution X s only comprises two extremal points.
Determined games
In this section we present a simple algorithm which works under the assumption that the game is determined. For stopping games, we then give a procedure to decide whether a game is determined. For the proof of the theorem we will make use of the following:
has a memoryless deterministic strategy with the same properties.
From the above theorem we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The following two statements are equivalent for determined games:
-A given point z lies in the downward closure of the Pareto curve for s.
-For all memoryless deterministic strategies σ of Player 2, there is a strategy π of Player 1 such that (π, σ) yield totrew(̺, z).
Thus, to compute the Pareto curve for a determined game G, it is sufficient to consider all memoryless deterministic strategies σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ m of Player 2 and use [9] to compute the Pareto curves f σi s for the games G σi induced by G and σ i (i.e. G σi is obtained from G by turning all s ∈ S ♦ to stochastic vertices and stipulating ∆(s, t) = σ i (s) for all successors t of s; in turn, G σi is a Markov decision process), and obtain the Pareto curve for G as the pointwise minimum
To decide if a stopping game is determined, it is sufficient to take the downward closures of solutions V s and check if they satisfy the equations from Sec. 2.1. Since in stopping games the solution of the equations is unique, if the sets are a solution they are also the Pareto curves and the game is determined. If any of the equations are not satisfied, then V s are not the Pareto curves and the game is not determined. Note that for non-stopping games the above approach does not work: even if the sets do not change by applying one step of value iteration, it is still possible that the solution is not the least fixpoint, and so we cannot infer any conclusion.
Games with two objectives
We start this section by showing that the existing value iteration algorithm presented in Sec. 2.1 might iteratively compute sets X i s with increasing number of extremal points, although the actual resulting set X s (and the associated Pareto curve f s ) is very simple. Consider the game from Fig. 3 (left) . Applying the value-iteration algorithm given by the equations from Sec. 2.1 for n steps gives a Pareto curve in s 0 with n − 1 extremal points. Each extremal point corresponds to a strategy π i that in s 0 chooses to go to s 2 when the number of visits of s 0 is less than i, and after that chooses to go to s 1 . The upper bounds of the sets X n s for n = 5 and n = 10 are drawn in Fig. 3 (centre and right, respectively) using solid line, and their extremal points are marked with dots. The Pareto curve f s is drawn with dashed blue line, and it consists of two extremal points, (0, 1) and (1, 0).
We now proceed with the main result of this section, the decidability of the two-objective strategy synthesis problem for stopping games. The result can be obtained from the following theorem.
Theorem 6. If G is a stopping stochastic two-player game with two objectives, and s a state of G then the Pareto curve f s has only finitely many extremal points.
The above theorem can be used to design the following algorithm. For a fixed number k, we create a formula ϕ k over (R, +, ·, ≤) which is true if and only if for each s ∈ S there are points
) satisfy the equations from Sec. 2.1. Using [14] we can then successively check validity of ϕ k for increasing k, and Thm. 6 guarantees that we will eventually get a formula which is valid, and it immediately gives us the Pareto curve. We get the following result as a corollary.
Corollary 7. Two-objective total reward problem is decidable for stopping stochastic games, and two-objective discounted-reward problem is decidable for stochastic games.
Outline of the proof of Thm. 6. The proof of Thm. 6 proceeds by assuming that there are infinitely many extremal points on the Pareto curve, and then deriving a contradiction. Firstly, because the game is stopping, an upper bound on the expected total reward that can be obtained with respect to a single total reward objective is M :=
is the smallest transition probability, and ̺ max = max i∈{1,2} max s∈S ̺ i (s) is the maximal reward assigned to a state. Thus, the Pareto curve is contained in a compact set, and this implies that there is an accumulation point on it. In Sec. 4.1, we show that we can follow one accumulation point p from one state to one of its successors, while preserving the same left slope. Moreover, in the neighbourhood of the accumulation point the rate at which the right slope decreases is quite similar to the decrease in the successors, in a way that is made precise in Lem. 9, 10, and 11. This is with the exception of some stochastic states for which the decrease strictly slows down when going to the successors: we will exploit this fact to get a contradiction. We construct a transition system T s0,p , which keeps all the paths obtained by following the accumulation point p from s 0 . We show that if G is a stopping game, then we can obtain a path in T s0,p which visits stochastic states for which the decrease of the right slope strictly slows down. This relies on results for inverse betting games, which are presented in Sec. 4.2. Since this decrease can be repeated and there are only finitely many reachable states in T s0,p , we show in Sec. 4.3 that the decrease of the right slope must be zero somewhere, meaning that the curve is constant in the neighbourhood of an accumulation point, which is a contradiction.
We will rely on the properties of the equations from Sec. 2.1 and the left and right slopes of the Pareto curve. Note that we introduced the notion of slope only for two-dimensional sets, and so our proofs only work for two dimensions. Generalisations of the concept of slopes exist for higher dimensions, but simple generalisation of our lemmas would not be valid, as we will show later. Hence, in the remainder of this section, we focus on the two-objective case. For the simplicity of presentation, we will present all claims and proofs for left accumulation points. The case of right accumulation points is analogous.
Mapping accumulation points to successor states
We start by enumerating some basic but useful properties of the Pareto curve and its slopes. First notice that it is a continuous concave function and we can prove the following: To prove Thm. 6, we will use the equations from Sec. 2.1 to describe how accumulation points on a Pareto curve for s "map" to accumulation points on successors. 
Proof (Sketch). The point 1. follows from the fact that every extremal point in the Pareto curve for s 0 must be an extremal point in one of the successors. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 
). This is illustrated in Fig. 4 (center) :
) infinitely many times. From this we get a converging sequence of points in s ℓ , and obtain that the left slopes are equal in s 0 and s ℓ . By further arguing that in any left neighbourhood of p i 1 − ̺ 1 (s 0 ) we can find infinitely many points with different left slopes, we obtain that there are also infinitely many extremal points in the neighbourhood and hence p i As for the last item, the important observation here is that if at some point p ′ , f s1 is strictly below f s2 then the right slope of f s0 corresponds to that of f s1 , and if f s1 equals f s2 then the right slope of f s0 corresponds to the minimum of the right slopes of f s1 and f s2 (it is also interesting to note that the left slope corresponds to the maximum of the two).
⊓ ⊔ 
-there are
.
Proof (Sketch).
We use the fact that for every extremal point p ′ there are unique extremal points q ′ and r ′ on f s1 and f s2 , respectively, such that p
, which can be surprising at first glance since one could have expected a weighted sum of the left slopes. This fact is illustrated in Fig. 4 
. The inequality lslope(s 0 , p) ≤ lslope(s 1 , q) (and similarly lslope(s 0 , p) ≤ lslope(s 2 , r)), follows from concavity of f s0 : because for all ε > 0 the inequality
holds true, from which we obtain lim ε→0 + fs 0 (p1)−fs 0 (p1−ε) ε
. Showing that the left slope is at least the minimum of the successors' slopes is significantly more demanding and technical, and we give the proof in the appendix.
Proving the second point, is based on the observation that a point on the Pareto curve f s0 is a combination of points of f s1 and f s2 that share a common tangent: in other words they maximize the dot product with a specific vector on their respective curves. From this observation it is possible to link the right slopes of these curves.
The last two points hold because with the assumption, extremal points that converge to p from the left can be obtained as a combination from a fixed r and points on f s2 . ⊓ ⊔ Now we will prove that there are no left accumulation points on the Pareto curve. To do that, we will try to follow one in the game: if there is a left accumulation point in one state then at least one of its successors also has one, as the above lemmas show. By using the fact that the left slopes of left accumulation points are preserved we show that the number of reachable combinations (s, p), where s ∈ S and p is a left accumulation point, is finite. We then look at points slightly to the left of the accumulation points, their distance to the accumulation point and right slopes are also mostly preserved except in stochastic states, where if only one successor has a left accumulation point, the decrease of the right slope accelerate (by Lem. 11.2). By using the fact that in stopping games we can ensure visiting such stochastic states, we will show that for some states the right slope is constant on the left neighbourhood of the left accumulation point, which is a contradiction.
Assume 
As a corollary of this lemma, the number of states that are reachable in T s0,p 0 is finite and bounded by |S|.
Inverse betting game
To show a contradiction, we will follow a path with left accumulation points. We want this path to visit stochastic states which have only one successor in T s0,p 0 . For that, we will prove a property of an intermediary game that we call an inverse betting game. An inverse betting game is a two player game, given by V ∃ , V ∀ , E, (v 0 , c 0 ), w where V ∃ and V ∀ are the set of vertices controlled by Eve and Adam, respectively, V ∃ ∪ V ∀ , E is a graph whose each vertex has two successors, (v 0 , c 0 ) ∈ V × R is the initial configuration, and w : E → R is a weight function such that for all Our next step is transforming the transition system T s0,p 0 into such a game. Consider the inverse betting game B on the structure given by T s0,p 0 where V ∃ = S are the states controlled by Eve,
is a weight on edges and the initial configuration is ((s 0 , p 0 ), ε 0 ). Let U s0,p 0 the set of terminal states and of stochastic states that have only one successor in T s0,p 0 . We show that in the inverse betting game obtained from a stopping game G, Eve can ensure visiting U s0,p 0 .
Lemma 14. If G is stopping, there is a strategy for Eve in B such that from every vertex v ∈ V , all outcomes visit
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that this is not the case, then by memoryless determinacy of turn-based reachability games (see e.g. [10] ) there is a vertex v and a memoryless deterministic strategy σ Adam of Adam, such that no outcomes of σ Adam from v visit U s0,p 0 . Let π and σ be the strategies of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively corresponding to σ Adam . Formally, if h ∈ Ω G then π(h) = σ Adam (h) and if h ∈ Ω ♦ G then σ(h) = σ Adam (h). We prove that all outcomes λ in G of π, σ from v are outcomes of σ Adam in B. This is by induction on the prefixes λ ≤i of the outcomes. It is clear when λ ≤i ends with states that are controlled by Player 1 and Player 2 by the way we defined π and σ, that λ ≤i+1 is also compatible with σ Adam in B. For a finite path λ ≤i ending with a stochastic state s in G, two successors are possible. With the induction hypothesis that λ ≤i is compatible with σ Adam , and by the assumption on σ Adam , s does not belong to U s0,p 0 . Therefore, both successors of s are also in T s0,p 0 , and λ ≤i+1 is compatible with σ Adam in B. This shows that outcomes in G of (π, σ) are also outcomes of σ Adam in B. Therefore, π and σ ensure that from v, we visit no state of U s0,p 0 and thus no terminal state. This contradicts that the game is stopping.
⊓ ⊔ Putting Thm. 13 and Lem. 14 together we can conclude the following:
Corollary 15. If G is stopping then in B, for any bound B, Eve has a strategy to ensure visiting U s0,p 0 with a credit c ≥ 1 or making c exceed B.
Contradicting sequence
We define θ(s 0 , p 0 ) = min{η(s, p) | (s, p) reachable in T s0,p 0 }, and consider a sequence of points that are θ(s 0 , p 0 ) close to p 0 and with a right slope that is decreasing at least as fast as that of their predecessors.
Lemma 16. For stopping games, given s 0 ∈ S, p 0 ∈ R 2 , and ε 0 > 0, such that ε 0 < θ(s 0 , p 0 ), there is a finite sequence π(s 0 , p 0 , ε 0 ) = (s i , p i , ε i ) i≤j such that:
The idea of the proof is that in B, thanks to Lem. 9, 10, and 11, Adam can always choose a successor such that rslope(f si , p
Then thanks to Cor. 15, there is a strategy for Eve to reach (U s0,p 0 × [c 0 , +∞)) ∪ (V × [B, +∞)). By combining the two strategies, we obtain an outcome that satisfies the desired properties.
We use the path obtained from this lemma to show that no matter how small ε 0 we choose, ε i can grow to reach θ(s 0 , p 0 ).
Lemma 17. For all states s with a left accumulation point p and for all
Thanks to this lemma, we can now prove Thm. 6. Assume towards a contradiction that there is a left accumulation point p in the state s.
the configuration of T s,p for which this minimum is reached (it is reached because the number of reachable configurations is finite: this is a corollary of Lem. 12). Because of Lem. 17, rslope(f s , p 1 −ε) is greater than m. By Lem. 8.3, when ε goes towards 0, rslope(f s , p 1 − ε) converges to lslope(f s , p 1 ). This means that lslope(f s , p 1 ) ≥ m. Moreover, by construction of T s,p , we also have that lslope(f s ′ , p Remark 18. One might attempt to extend the proof of Thm. 6 to three or more objectives, but this does not seem to be easily doable. Although it is possible to use directional derivative (or pick a subgradient) instead of using left and right slope in such setting, an analogue of Lem. 8.2 cannot be proved because in multiple dimensions, two accumulation points can share the same directional derivative, for a fixed direction. It is also not easily possible to avoid this problem by following several directional derivatives instead of just one. This is because the slope in one direction may be inherited from one successor while the slope in another direction comes from another successor. We give more details and example of convex sets that would contradict generalisations of Lem. 8.2 and Lem. 10 in Appendix E.
Conclusions
We have studied stochastic games under multiple objectives, and have provided decidability results for determined games and for stopping games with two objectives. Our results for non-determined games provide an important milestone towards obtaining decidability for the general case, which is a major task which will require further novel insights into the problem. Another research direction concerns establishing an upper bound on the number of extremal points of a Pareto curve; such result would allow us to give upper complexity bounds for the problem.
Proof. 1. Assume that f s is defined for some x, x ′ . For all x ′′ ∈ (x, x ′ ), by convexity (x ′′ ,
) can be achieved. We define y = sup{y | (x ′′ , y) achievable}, it is defined because of the previous remark, and by the properties of stopping games (x ′′ , y) is achievable and we now show that (x ′′ , y) ∈ f s . Assume there is an achievable p with p 1 > x ′′ . Then by convexity of the set of achievable points [7] , any point in [(x, f s (x)), p ] is achievable. Because (x, f s (x)) lies on the Pareto curve, we have f s (x) > p 2 (otherwise (x, f s (x)) is not maximal point satisfying the defining properties of the Pareto curve), therefore (x ′′ ,
is achievable which contradicts the definition of y. Therefore, f s is defined in x ′′ and equals p 2 .
The fact that if
comes by the definition of Pareto curves and the fact that (x, f s (x)) lies on a Pareto curve. We now prove that f s is concave. Let x < x ′ in the domain of f s and t ∈ [0, 1]. By convexity of the set
) can be ensured. Hence, there is a point p that is strictly greater than t · (x, f s (x)) + (1 − t) · (x ′ , f s (x ′ )) that belongs to f s . Since f s is defined in t · x + (1 − t) · x ′ and it is decreasing this means that
. This shows concavity. 
contains an extremal point. 
If f is a concave function whose left slope is defined in
In particular, assuming towards a contradiction that for all
. Consider now the function −f . As a consequence of what we just proved,
. Since
, it is defined for x ′ smaller than x and close enough to x.
Moreover by concavity of f , g is decreasing, therefore its left limit in x is well defined, and equals the left slope of f in x. 3. By concavity, for x < x ′ and 0 < ε <
ε Hence, it is the same for the limit when ε moves towards 0 and lslope(f, x) ≥ lslope(f, x ′ ). 4. Assume towards a contradiction that lslope(f, x) = lslope(f, x ′ ), and p is an extremal point with x < p 1 < x ′ . By item 3 this means the slope is constant on [x, x ′ ] and as a consequence of item 1, it is equal to
x ′ − x Which is in contradiction with the fact that on [x, x ′ ] the slope is constant and equal to
Assume towards a contradiction that [x, x
′ ] contains no extremal point, then for all
) is a convex combination of (x, f (x)) and (
. This is in particular the case for x ′ . Since lslope(f, x) = lslope(f, x ′ ), x has a left slope different from all the points in (x, x ′ ]; we will prove that (x, f (x)) is an extremal point. If x is a convex combination of two points of the curve given by f , then as all the points on its right are below the line segment [(x, f (x)), (x ′ , f (x ′ ))], one point p ∈ f with p 1 < x must be above the corresponding line. By concavity, this is also the case for all the x ′′ ∈ (p 1 , x). This means that
. The limit when x ′′ goes towards x is also smaller than
It cannot be greater because by item 3 the slope decreases. This contradicts that lslope(f, x) = lslope(f, x ′ ). This contradiction proves that [x, x ′ ] contains an extremal point. 6. The fact that lim
comes from the fact that the slope is decreasing (point 3). We now show lslope(f, x) ≤ lim x ′ →x − lslope(f, x ′ ) which implies the result. Assume towards a contradiction that lim
Then there is ε > 0 such that 
Proof. To lighten the notation we will write f i instead of f si in the following. Assume towards a contradiction that there is x where f 1 and f 2 are defined and where f 0 is not defined. Let y be the maximum such that p = (x, y) can be ensured from s 0 . Since f 0 is not defined in x, there exists (x ′ , y ′ ) ∈ A s0 such that x < x ′ and y ≤ y ′ . By downward closure of the set of achievable points, (x, y ′ ) can be ensured from s 0 , thus by definition of y, y ′ ≤ y and therefore y = y ′ . Then there is (x ′ , y) ∈ A s0 with x ′ > x. By the characterisation of the set of values that can be ensured, we have (x ′ , y) ∈ conv(A s1 ∪ A s2 ), so there are λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ [0, 1] and q, r ∈ A s1 ∪ A s2 such that λ 1 + λ 2 = 1 and (x ′ , y) = λ 1 · q + λ 2 · r. If q 1 > y then there is some p ′ which can be ensured with p
which by downward closedness contradicts the fact that y is the maximum such that (x, y) can be ensured. The case r 2 > y is similar. In the remaining cases y = q 2 = r 2 . Assume w.l.o.g. q 1 ≥ x, and therefore q ≥ (x, y). Since f 1 is defined in x, f 1 (x) > q 2 . By characterisation of the set of values that can be ensured y ≥ f 1 (x) > q 2 which is a contradiction. This shows that if f 1 and f 2 are defined then f 0 also is. Since lslope(f 0 , x) is defined for all x where f 0 except the left-most point, it is defined where f 1 and f 2 are defined except the left-most point of one of the two. In this left-most point one of the two slopes is not defined. This shows that if both left slopes are defined then lslope(f 0 , x) also is. The proof proceeds similarly for the right slopes.
Let m = min(lslope(f 1 , x), lslope(f 2 , x)) and n = (−m, 1). Assume towards a contradiction that lslope(f 0 , x) < m. Then by definition of lslope there exists x ′ < x such that
) is a convex combination of q ′ and r ′ . Because their convex combination has greater dot product with n than (x, f 0 (x)), it is also the case of one of the points q ′ or r ′ . Without loss of generality, we assume it is q ′ . So we have f 1 (q
which is a contradiction.
and by the characterization of the Pareto curve
We now turn to the case of max. By the characterization of the Pareto curve, there are q, r ∈ A s1 ∪ A s2 such that (x, f 0 (x)) is a convex combination of q and r. Let
We first prove lslope(f 0 , x) ≤ lslope(f ′ , q 1 ) (and obtain similarly lslope(f 0 , x) ≤ lslope(f ′′ , r 1 )). By the characterisation of the Pareto curve, for all ε = 0,
The limit when ε goes towards 0 is smaller than that of
. Now, since their convex combination contains x, one of q 1 and r 1 is greater than x. Assume without loss of generality that it is q 1 . Then q 1 ≥ x and by Lem. 3, lslope(f
We now turn to the case of rslope. This is in fact the same proof if we consider the function g 0 : x → f 0 (1 − x), which is also concave and for which lslope(g 0 , x) = −rslope(f 0 , 1 − x): at no point did we use the fact that the slope was negative. So what we proved for f 0 is also valid for g 0 , which means min(rslope(f s1 , x), rslope(f s2 , x)) ≤ rslope(f s0 , x) ≤ max(rslope(f s1 , x), rslope(f s2 , x)).
⊓ ⊔
We are now ready to prove Lem. 9. 
Proof. By the characterisation of the Pareto curve, the extremal points of the Pareto curve f s0 are included in the extremal points of f s1 and f s2 . Let (p i ) i∈N be a sequence of extremal points of the Pareto curve in s 0 which converges to p. We assume that the first coordinate of the sequence is increasing (note that we can always extract a sub-sequence which satisfies that). Each p i is either an extremal point of s 1 or of s 2 , therefore the Pareto curve of one of the two contains infinitely many points p i . We first show that for any s ′ for which this holds, the first two points are true for s ′ . We will then show that the third point is satisfied by one such s ′ . 1. Since there is a subsequence of p i which are extremal points of s ′ and which converges to p from the left, p is a left accumulation point of s ′ .
Moreover since lim
is well defined and (p i 1 ) i∈N converges to p 1 , we have that:
) extremal in f s1 } and let q be an extremal point of s 0 with q 1 ∈ (x 1 , p 1 ). Since extremal points of s 0 are included in those of s 1 and s 2 , the extremal points on [q 1 , x] and x are the same. Since moreover (q 1 , f 0 (q 1 )) and (x, f 0 (x)) are extremal points of both f 0 and f 2 , the curves f 0 and f 2 coincide on [q 1 , x]. So the property we want is satisfied by s ′ = s 2 and η(s 0 , p) = x − q 1 . Similarly, if p is not a left accumulation point for s 2 , then s ′ = s 1 and some η(s 0 , p) witnesses the property.
If p is a left accumulation point for s 1 but lslope(f s1 , p) = lslope(f 0 , p), then by what was proven in point 2, we conclude that there is no infinite sequence of extremal points of s 1 that are also extremal points of s 0 and converge to p. There is a left neighbourhood of x where f 1 is below f 2 (otherwise some extremal point would be above and also be an extremal point of f 0 ). Hence, the curves f 0 and f s2 coincide on some neighbourhood of x. So the property we want is satisfied by s ′ = s 2 and some η(s 0 , p). Similarly, if lslope(f s1 , p) = lslope(f s , p), then s ′ = s 1 and some η(s 0 , p) witnesses the property.
In the other cases, both s 1 and s 2 satisfy points 1 and 2. By Lem. 21, there is s For all x where f s1 is defined and f s2 is defined, f s0 is defined in x + ̺ 1 (s 0 ) and: 
Similarly, rslope(f s0 , x+̺ 1 (s 0 )) = lim x ′ →x + fs 0 (x ′ )−fs 0 (x)
and lslope(f s1 , x) = lslope(f s2 , x) then for a sequence (x i ) i∈N that converges to x from the left, lim i→∞ fs 0 (xi+̺ 1 (s0))−fs 0 (x+̺ 1 (s0))
xi−x = lslope(f s0 , x + ̺ 1 (s 0 )). By the characterisation of the Pareto curve, f s0 (
}, so there are infinitely many x i in the sequence for which ̺ 2 (s 0 ) + f s1 (x i ) = f s0 (x i + ̺ 1 (s 0 )) or there are infinitely many x i in the sequence for which ̺ 2 (s 0 ) + f s2 (x i ) = f s0 (x i + ̺ 1 (s 0 )). Without loss of generality we assume it is for s 1 . lslope(f 1 , x) = lim i→∞
We could prove similarly, by considering a sequence x i that converges from the right, that rslope(
We will now show that if f s1 (x) = f s2 (x) and lslope(f s1 , x) < lslope(f s2 , x), then lslope(f s0 , x + ̺ 1 (s 0 )) = lslope(f s2 , x), which shows the property. Since:
there is ε > 0, such that for all x ′ ∈ [x−ε, x),
(by characterization of the Pareto curve). Hence,
The proof is quite similar for the right slope. Assume rslope(f s1 (x)) < rslope(f s2 , x). Since:
= lim
there is ε > 0, such that for all x ′ ∈ (x, x+ε),
. This implies that f s1 (x ′ ) < f s2 (x ′ ), and therefore
(by characterisation of the Pareto curve). Hence, 
Proof. We first show that for each x where f s0 is defined, there is s ′ ∈ {s 1 , s 2 } such that lslope(s 0 , x) = lslope(s ′ , x − ̺ 1 (s 0 )). Let (x i ) i∈N be a sequence converging towards x. By the characterization of the Pareto curve, for each i ∈ N,
It will be either f s1 or f s2 infinitely often. We write s ′ for a state such that f s0 (
We can extract a subsequence of x i so that we can assume f s0 (
) for all i. Since this sequence converges to x, by continuity of f s ′ (Lem. 3) and f s0 , we have
. We now show we can extract (x τ (i) ) i∈N , an infinite subsequence of (x i ) i∈N , whose elements all have different slopes. Since p is a left accumulation point for f s0 , for each x τ (i) , there are two extremal points for f s0 in (x τ (i) , x). Because of Lem. 20.4, no more than two extremal points can have the same slope, the slope of second extremal point p ′ is strictly less than that of x τ (i) . Thus, by choosing τ (i + 1) such that x τ (i+1) > p ′ 1 , we ensure that the slope of all x τ (i) is different. This shows we can extract an infinite subsequence of (x i ) i∈N whose all elements have different slopes. To simplify notations, we will still write (x i ) i∈N for this subsequence, and assume all slopes lslope(f s0 , x i ) are different.
Because we showed lslope(s 0 , x) ∈ {lslope(s 1 , x−̺ 1 (s 0 )), lslope(s 2 , x−̺ 1 (s 0 ))} for all points x where f s0 is defined, this is also the case for each x i . We can extract an infinite subsequence of (x i ) i∈N such that it always corresponds to the same state. We can then assume that there is s ′ ∈ {s 1 , s 2 }, such that for all i ∈ N, lslope(s 0 , x i ) = lslope(s ′ , x i − ̺ 1 (s 0 )). Since the slopes of every x i is different, by Lem. 20.5, this implies that there is an infinite number of extremal points in the neighbourhood of p. This means that p is a left accumulation point for either s 1 or s 2 .
We now prove point 3. If p is not a left accumulation point for s 1 , let
Since f s1 and f s2 are concave their curves can only intersect twice in [x 1 , x]. Since f s0 has an infinite number of extremal points in this interval (shifted by ̺ 1 (s 0 )) and f s1 has none, we can deduce from Lem. 20.5 and Lem. 23 that f s2 is below f s1 in a neighbourhood
). So the property we want is satisfied by s ′ = s 2 and η(s 0 , p) = x − q 1 . Similarly, if p is not a left accumulation point for s 2 , then s ′ = s 1 and some η(s 0 , p) witness the property.
If p is a left accumulation point for s 1 but lslope(f s1 , p 1 −̺ 1 (s 0 )) = lslope(f s0 , p 1 ), then we can conclude from Lem. 23 that lslope(f s1 , p 1 ) < lslope(f s , p 1 ) = lslope(f s2 , p 1 ). Hence, on some left neighbourhood of x, f s2 is strictly below f s1 . This means that the curves f s0 and f s2 (shifted by ̺(s 0 )) coincide on some neighbourhood of x. So the property we want is satisfied by s ′ = s 2 and some η(s 0 , p). Similarly, if lslope(f s1 , p 1 ) = lslope(f s0 , p 1 ), then s ′ = s 1 and some η(s 0 , p) witnesses the property.
In the other cases, both s 1 satisfies point (1) and (2). By Lem. 23, there is . Proof. Because p is achievable in s 0 , by characterization of the Pareto curve, there are q achievable in s 1 and r achievable in s 2 such that p = ∆(s 0 , s 1 ) · q + ∆(s 0 , s 2 ) · r. We assume towards a contradiction that q is not from f s1 (i.e. it lies strictly below the Pareto curve); the proof works in the same way for r in s 2 . Then there would be some q ′ > q that is achievable in s 1 . By characterization of the Pareto curve p ′ = ∆(s 0 , s 1 ) · q ′ + ∆(s 0 , s 2 ) · r is also achievable. However, we have p ′ > p which is a contradiction with the fact that p ∈ f s0 . This shows the first part of the lemma. Now for the second part of the lemma, assume that p 1 ≤ p 
Similarly: Therefore, lslope(s 0 , p 1 ) ≤ lslope(s 1 , q 1 ). The proof also works for r and therefore lslope(s 0 , p 1 ) ≤ min(lslope(s 1 , q 1 ), lslope(s 2 , r 1 )).
We now show that lslope(s 0 , p 1 ) ≥ min(lslope(s 1 , q 1 ), lslope(s 2 , r 1 )). Assume towards a contradiction that lslope(s 0 , p 1 ) < min(lslope(s 1 , q 1 ), lslope(s 2 , r 1 )). By definition of lslope there exists x ′ < p 1 such that:
x ′ − p 1 < min(lslope(s 1 , q 1 ), lslope(s 2 , r 1 )) By Lem. 25, there are q ′ ∈ f s1 and r ′ ∈ f s2 such that (x ′ , f s0 (x ′ )) = ∆(s 0 , s 1 ) · q ′ + ∆(s 0 , s 2 ) · r ′ and q 
